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If a Micro Processor Unit (MPU) receives an external electric signal as noise, the system function
will freeze or malfunction easily. A new resilience strategy is implemented in order to reset the
MPU automatically and stop the MPU from freezing or malfunctioning. The technique is useful
for embedded systems which work in non-human environments. However, evaluating resilience
strategies is difficult because their effectiveness depends on numerous, complex, interacting factors.
In this paper, we use probabilistic model checking to evaluate the embedded systems installed
with the above mentioned new resilience strategy. Qualitative evaluations are implemented with
6 PCTL formulas, and quantitative evaluations use two kinds of evaluation. One is system failure
reduction, and the other is ADT (Average Down Time), the industry standard. Our work demonstrates
the benefits brought by the resilience strategy. Experimental results indicate that our evaluation is
cost-effective and reliable.
1 Introduction
If a Micro Processor Unit (MPU) receives an external electric signal as noise, the system function will
freeze or malfunction easily [1]. Therefore, a resilience strategy for the MPU in a non-human envi-
ronment is needed so that the embedded system can continue working [2]. This paper considers a new
resilience technique in order to reset the MPU automatically and to prevent the MPU from freezing. The
application programs restart from backup data. Therefore, the temporal failure has no apparent effect on
the application programs. This resilience strategy is implemented as a system that works between the
hardware and operating system. This system is named FUJIMI1. In the FUJIMI system, Non-Maskable
Interrupts (NMI) and Reset signals (RST) are triggered [3] periodically to save data for backup and then
the backup data is used to reset the MPU. Figure 1 is an example comparing two embedded systems with
and without the FUJIMI system installed to show that system failure is reduced from once a day to once
every 4 days.
Evaluating such resilience strategies is a challenging task because the evaluations depend on many
complex factors including probabilistic noise environments. As a result, empirical experimentation is
often a more useful approach for evaluation than proofs or formal approaches. However, evaluating
a live system under noise attack is time-intensive and costly, and only achieves results under limited
cases. This paper presents a formal approach to providing cost-effective and reliable evaluations of
resilience strategies by means of simulation and probabilistic model checking. We simulate the resilience
strategy with a probabilistic model and present a qualitative verification and quantitative assessment for
the model. We use PRISM [4] [5], which is a tool for formal modeling and analysis of systems that
exhibit probabilistic behavior. DTMC (Discrete-Time Markov Chain) is the specification language, and
PCTL (Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic) is used for analysis [6].
1FUJIMI means always alive in Japanese.
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Figure 1: The Embedded System With (right) And Without (left) The FUJIMI system
The results of qualitative verification support certain claims and expectations of resilience strategy.
Quantitative assessments provide two types of evidence to demonstrate how the resilience strategy im-
proves the system effectiveness: reduction of system failure and standard industry criteria ADT. In other
words, the qualitative verification ensures the analysis results from the model are correct and the quan-
titative assessments demonstrate the benefits of the resilience strategy. Moreover, the system can be
optimized for different noise environments and strategy variations. The evaluations were difficult to
acquire when testing with a fully implemented embedded system until our work.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 is a preliminary explanation for
probabilistic model checking and PCTL. Section 3 explains the principle and the resilience strategy of
the FUJIMI system. Section 4 discusses how to construct the formal probabilistic model. Section 5
describes our methods for system evaluation. Section 6 reviews several examples of related work. In
Section 7, the paper concludes with a discussion about our contributions and future research.
2 Probabilistic model checking and PCTL
Probabilistic model checking is a formal verification technique for establishing the correctness, perfor-
mance, and reliability of systems which exhibit stochastic and probabilistic behavior. As in conventional
model checking, a model of the probabilistic system, usually some variant of a Markov chain, is built and
then subjected to algorithmic analysis to establish whether it satisfies a given specification. The speci-
fications are usually stated as formula of probabilistic temporal logic which, in addition to conventional
modalities, may include probabilistic operators whose outcome is true/false depending on the probability
of certain executions.
In this paper, we report on our experiences using the probabilistic model checker PRISM [4] [5]. We
use DTMC as the modeling language and use PTCL to verify the properties [6].
2.1 DTMC (Discrete-Time Markov Chains) Model
DTMCs are defined as state-transition systems augmented with probabilities. States represent possible
configurations of a system. Transitions among states occur at a discrete time and have an associated
probability. DTMCs are discrete stochastic processes with the Markov property [4] [6], according to
which the probability distribution of future states depend only upon the current state. Formally, a labeled
DTMC is tuple M = (S,S0,P,L):
• S is a finite set of states
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• S0 ∈ S is a set of initial states
• P : S×S → [0,1] is a transition probability matrix where ∑s′∈S P(s,s′) = 1 for all s ∈ S.
• L : S → 2AP is a labeling function which assigns to each state a set of Atomic Propositions which
are true in that state.
A DTMC model is described as a number of modules which can interact with each other. After
definition of local and global variables, the behavior of each module is described by a set of commands
with the form: []guard− > prob1 : update1 + ...+ probn : updaten. The guard is a predicate over all the
variables in the model. Each transition represents an update which the module can make if the guard is
true. The update is assigned a probability.
2.2 PCTL and Probabilistic Model Checking
PCTL is a logic language inspired by CTL [6]. In place of the existential and universal quantification
of CTL, PCTL provides the probabilistic operator ℘✶p(.), where p ∈ [0,1] is probability bound and
✶∈ {≤,<,≥,>}. PCTL is defined by the following syntax:
Φ ::= true | a | Φ∧Φ | ¬Φ |℘✶p(Ψ)
Ψ ::= XΦ | ΦUΦ | ΦU≤tΦ
Formulas Φ are named state f ormulas and can be evaluated over a Boolean domain (true, f alse) in
each state. Formulas Ψ are named path formulas, and describe a pattern over the set of all possible paths
originating in the state where they are evaluated. The satisfaction relation for a state s in PCTL is:
s |= true
s |= a iff a ∈ L(s)
s |= ¬Φ iff s |=/ Φ
s |= Φ1∧Φ2 iff s |= Φ1 and s |= Φ2
s |=℘✶p(Ψ) iff Pr(s |= ψ) ✶ p
The satisfaction relation for a path formula with respect to a path pi originating in s (i.e.,pi[0] = s) is
defined as:
pi |= XΦ iff pi[1] |= Φ
pi |= ΦUΨ iff ∃ j ≥ 0.(pi[ j] |= Ψ∧ (∀k : 0≤ k < j.pi[k] |= Φ))
pi |= ΦU≤tΨ iff ∃0≤ j ≤ t.(pi[ j] |= Ψ∧ (∀k : 0 ≤ k < j.pi[k] |= Φ))
PCTL is an expressive language that allows many interesting reliability-related properties to be spec-
ified. The most important case is a reachability property. A reachability property states that a state where
a certain characteristic property holds is eventually reached from a given initial state. Such state may
represent a failure state, in which a transaction executed by the system modeled by the DTMC eventually
terminates, or a success state.
There are also operators as S and R, which are not in the syntax but are well defined in the PRISM
for analysis [4][7]. The S operator is used to reason about the steady-state behavior of a model. The R
operator supports the specification and analysis of properties based on costs and rewards. Probabilistic
model checking is a decision problem: Given a finite Markov chain M, and PCTL state formula Φ,
determine whether s |=M Φ. The following shows several examples for the reliability requirements:
• P≥0.001(1 ≤ s ≤ 2 U s = 3): The probability that the system stays between states 1 and 2 until it
reaches state 3, is greater than 0.001
• P≥0.001(1≤ s≤ 3 U≤5 s = 4): The probability that the system stays between states 1 and 3 until it
reaches state 4 within 5 steps, is greater than 0.001
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• S < 0.05[size/max > 0.75]: The long-run probability of the value of size/max being more than
75%, is less than 0.05
3 The FUJIMI System
This section introduces the principle and the resilience strategy of the FUJIMI system. The FUJIMI
system is mainly used in game machine currently. The Non-stop property of game machine is enforced by
the Japanese Government to avoid an argument between the players and the operator if a game machine
freezes2. Before the explanation of the FUJIMI system, we distinguish three kinds of initial process:
• Cold start: The process initializes the hardware, operating system and the user application when
the power is on. In general, the process consumes much time.
• Hot start: The system initializes the operating system and user application, without initial pro-
cessing of the hardware. The process needs less time than cold start, but the intermediate results
of the user application are lost.
• FUJIMI reset: The periodical reset process for the resilience strategy of FUJIMI system. The
process needs less time than cold start and hot start, and the intermediate results of the user
application can be preserved.
3.1 System Principle
For an embedded system which works in an environment without operators present but must work con-
tinually, such as a wind velocity meter in open country, keeping the system working continually is an
important issue. However, it is not rare for microcomputers of embedded system to fall into failures
such as stop, f reeze, and lockup, which are caused by many problems including illegal instruction, bus
errors, etc. For example, the instruction pointer may read a data area as an instruction and give the wrong
results, or the synchronizations may deviate within the plurality sequencers. Noise, such as an abnormal
electrical shock in the circuit of the semiconductor is one general reason for these problems. These prob-
lems may cause the system to enter into an incorrect status temporarily and this will bring serious effects
to the system.
Beside well-known methods to recover the system such as watch-dog, power reset and redundant
hardware, there are also many resilience strategies such as DRB (Distributed Recovery Blocks), NVP (N-
version programming) and NSCP (N self-checking Programming) [8]. However, there is no omnipotent
solution for malfunction and freezing of the micro-computer. The MPU malfunction can be categorized
as below (level0 is a normal status) [9]:
• level0: Running normally without any problems
• level1: Spurious Interrupt is caused
• level2: One byte contents of RAM is corrupted or I/O direction is changed
• level3: Many contents of RAM are destroyed
• level4: CPU execution is into the abnormal condition
• level5: A virtual SCR (Silicon Controlled Rectifier) is triggered and active the latch up [10]
2The operation of FUJIMI system has already been proven over 30 million game machines. Dragonchip Inc., in Hong Kong,
for example, has made one series of FUJIMI MPU.
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Figure 2: The System Principle
From level0 to level3, the errors can be fixed with the current technologies [3]. Once the violation
condition on level4 occurs, the MPU cannot resume by itself and must be rescued by a watch-dog in
traditional systems. However, the watch-dog can rescue the embedded system only if the problems are
detected. For level5, there is no other way to escape from this except by using Power Off.
A resilience system named FUJIMI [9] is proposed to recover a system from temporary software
failure at level4. The FUJIMI system runs on a general purpose CPU such as M68030, which works
between the hardware and the operating system. As shown is Figure 2, the clock periodically generates
a Non-Maskable Interrupt (NMI) and after some interval, generates a reset interrupt (RST ) to the MPU.
The intervals between two RST is called a cycle in this paper. When the FUJIMI system receives NMI,
it saves backup data consisting of minimum information for recovery, and then enters into the waiting
status. When the interrupt RST is signaled, the embedded system is reset with the valid backup data, or
initializes a hot start when there is no valid backup data and the system is forced to execute from the
beginning of an application. The FUJIMI resilience strategy has the following advantages:
• The strategy recovers systems much faster than general resilience strategies such as watch-dog,
which is essential for time-response critical systems. Temporal system failures can be resumed by
a short periodical cycle process.
• The applications can be restarted without loss of the intermediate results. The temporal failure
caused by noise has no apparent effect on the application programs.
• The resilience strategy is implemented without redundancy hardware. This strategy is useful for a
system that has limitation of power or cost.
3.2 Resilience Strategy
As previously discussed, the system uses two kinds of signal: NMI and RST . The basic idea lies in
periodically backing-up the data with NMI signal and recover with RST signal. We denote the cur-
rent data as cdata, and denote the backup data as pdata. The data for recovery are saved n times as
pdata1, pdata2, . . . , pdatan. Each recovery data can be reused m times, and keeps valid until it is used
for m times, where it becomes invalid which represents that it cannot be used anymore.
When NMI signal arises, the FUJIMI system checks whether CPU is in the normal state by checking
the program counter and the stack pointer. As in the upper part of Figure 3, if the MPU is in the normal
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Figure 3: The Save and Reset Pro-
cess
Figure 4: The Recover Process
state, the save process is carried out from right to left as pdatan−1 to pdatan, pdatan−2 to pdatan−1,
. . . , pdata2 to pdata1, and finally cdata to pdata1. All the pdata are marked as valid and the initial
number m is assigned to the usage times. If the CPU is not in the normal state, the NMI interrupt is
ignored and the system starts an undisturbed loop until an RST interrupt arises.
When the FUJIMI system receives RST signal, the reset exception handler checks the contents of
RAM. If the FUJIMI system is not in the procedure for cold start or hot start, the most recent valid
pdata is copied to cdata as in the lower part of Figure 3 (the actual line represents that the data is valid
and the dotted line represents invalid data). For example, if the pdata1 is valid, then the CPU state is
recovered from pdata1, the usage time will becomes m− 1. If pdata1 has been used for m time and
became invalid, the system will try to recover from the pdata2. The process is similar until pdatan is
exhausted and becomes invalid. When all the pdata are invalid, the system cannot be recovered and then
the hot start begins. In this manner, this system achieves m ∗ n times of software redundancy without
overage cost and power consumption caused by hardware redundancy.
Figure 4 shows an example of the recovery process with 2 previous data pdata1 and pdata2, and
each pdata can be reused 2 times. The process recovers 2 noise effectiveness within 4 cycles. However,
the system cannot be rescued when the 3rd noise occurs, where both the two pdata are invalid, and then
a hot start begins. The following steps from 1-14 explain the process of recovery. The number for the
items corresponds to the timing shown with the underlining in Figure 4.
1. After the cold start finishes normally, the initial system status in which the cdata, pdata1 and
pdata2 are correct, and both pdata1 and pdata2 are valid.
2. Noise occurs for the 1st time and makes the cdata incorrect.
3. NMI is triggered. The cdata is incorrect and detection fails; the correct pdata1 is saved to pdata2,
and the incorrect cdata is saved to pdata1.
4. The incorrect pdata1 is reset to cdata, and the usage times decrease from 2 to 1.
5. The incorrect cdata is detected, and the save process of NMI fails.
6. The incorrect pdata1 is reset to cdata, and then pdata1 becomes invalid after decrementing by
one for the second time.
7. The incorrect cdata is detected, and the save process of NMI fails.
8. The correct pdata2 is reset to cdata, and then the usage times decreases from 2 to 1 because
pdata1 is invalid. The system is recovered for the 1st noise.
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9. Noise occurs again and makes the cdata incorrect.
10. The incorrect cdata is detected, and the save process of NMI fails.
11. The correct pdata2 is reset to cdata, and then becomes invalid after minus 1 for the 2nd time. The
system is recovered for the 2nd noise.
12. Noise occurs 3rd times and makes the cdata incorrect; no more valid pdata can be used for recov-
ery because pdata1 and pdata2 are both invalid.
13. The incorrect cdata is detected, and the save process of NMI fails.
14. The hot start process begins.
As previously noted, evaluating resilience against noise is another important theme in the reliability
of a system. Until our work, implementation tests have been the most accurate evaluation method.
However, these tests need a long monitor test for a large amount of samples. For example, for the
software error rate of a product, intended to evaluate the ability of several hundred samples, requires
20,000 hours for testing [10].
4 Probabilistic Model
This section explains the modeling for the FUJIMI system described in Section 3. Our objective is to
build a probabilistic model for evaluating resilience strategies against noise-attack behaviors. The model
must simulate the resilience strategy, but not cause an explosion problem [6]. Furthermore, the model
must be flexible for a variety of different configurations for system optimizations.
The model is constructed with Discrete Time Markov Chains (DTMCs) as introduced in Section 2.1.
We comprehensively explore our model’s multi-dimensional parameter space by systematically varying
two key probabilistic parameters, including:
• The noise occurrence probability: The external environment electronic shock makes the cdata
incorrect and makes the embedded system fall into failure. The probability value depends on the
external environment where the embedded system works.
• The err detection probability: The detection of an error in the current data is also another proba-
bility, which means that an incorrect cdata will be either be detected or ignored. The probability
value depends on the detection ability of the hardware.
The model is decomposed into three modules: Timer, Recovery Data, and Recover Function in
Figure 5. The definition is in Figure 6. Recovery Data and Recover Function interact and coordinate
with each other synchronizing with Timer. Actions are used to force two or more modules transition
simultaneously [4]. For example, the following codes are from Timer module and Recovery Function
module respectively. The transitions are synchronized with the action tick, which simulates the clock t in
the embedded system. The upper code refers that the noise occurs with the probability prob noise when
the clock ticks forward before reaching tc (time cycle). The lower code refers that the CPU keeps normal
before the clock reaches NMI if the noise does not occur.
[tick](t < tc)→ prob noise : (noise′= true)∧ (t′= t + 1)+ (1− prob noise) : (noise′= f alse)∧ (t′= t + 1)
[tick](t < NMI)∧ (cpu = normal)∧ (noise = f alse)→ (cpu′= normal)
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Figure 5: The Model Transitions
Figure 6: The Model Definition
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Timer: The timer has a simple loop transition as 0 → 1 → 2 · · · → tc → 0 → 1 → . . . with an assigned
cycle value tc. The noise occurs with a probability for each tick according to the environments. The
transitions are shown in Figure 5 (Timer).
Recovery Data (pdata): As shown in Figure 5 (Recovery Data), pdata transits between valid and
invalid, according to the system status and recover strategy. The transitions are deterministic. Each
pdata has a Boolean value that records if the data is correct, and an Integer value to record the usage
times.
At the reset timing when RST signal arises, the pdatas transit self-loops with a decreasing usage
number, and transit from valid to invalid when the pdata exhausts to 0. At the save timing when NMI is
triggered, the state transits from invalid to valid and the usage is set to the initial number m.
Recover Function: As shown in Figure 5 (Recover Function), the recover function processes the recover
algorithm for save and reset when NMI and RST interrupts are triggered respectively, and also processes
the corresponding process when noise occurs. The cdata and pdata are operated by the recover function,
while synchronizing with the Timer. The initial state is user application representing the process when
the cold start has finished correctly.
For the recover function, the system transits within the self-loop at the state user application when
the user application executes correctly. noise will occur with probability, which causes cdata to transit to
the status cdata error. At the timing of NMI, if cdata is correct or if cdata is error, but is not detected,
the system will enter into the copy process status where the process of Figure 3 (upper part) is carried
out. After copy process finishes, the system will enter into reset waiting. If the error status is detected,
and the system will enter into reset waiting immediately. In this case, the NMI will be ignored and the
copy process in Figure 3 (upper part) will not be carried out.
The state transits with a self-loop at the state reset waiting until the RST signal arises. At the timing
where the RST exception occurs, the system will enter into the FUJIMI reset where the process of
Figure 3 (lower part) is carried out if there is a valid pdata. But when all the pdata become invalid and
there is no valid data for system recovery, the system transits to hot start state.
5 Qualitative and Quantitative Evaluations
PRISM supports the automated analysis of a wide range of qualitative and quantitative properties of prob-
abilistic models with the probability temporal logic PCTL. In this section, we illustrate the qualitative
and quantitative evaluations for the FUJIMI system, using the experimental data with three applications
named Sensor, Logger and Ballon as shown in Table 13. The experimental environment was as follows.
Model checker: PRISM 4.0.3; CPU: Intel 1.70GHz; 2.9 GB RAM. The code for the model was about
130 lines.
NMI Process is the time for the NMI process to save pdata. RST Process is the time for FUJIMI
process to reset pdata. NtoR Duration is the time from the beginning of periodical NMI to the beginning
of the RST; User Application represents the continuous application operation time, which must not be
disturbed. For example, if an application communicates with the MPU, time for the minimum necessary
time must be reserved because it must not be disturbed. NtoR Duration is usually set to 3 times that
3Sensor receives the data from the anemometer and then sends the data to a processor; Logger saves the data received
from the sensor to SD memory; Balloon is an action game with a touch panel. The periods of time are measured through the
embedded codes. The embedded codes manipulate the external terminal, and the oscilloscope records the external terminals
changes.
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NMI Process RST Process NtoR Duration User Application Hot Start Cold Start
Sensor 9.6µs 16.2 µs 500 µs 14.9 ms 110 µs 117 µs
Logger 94 µs 114 µs 300 µs 49.6 ms 170 ms 220 ms
Ballon 66 µs 84 µs 25 µs 14.4 ms 76 ms 780 ms
Table 1: Configuration of 3 applications
of NMI Process time for a sufficient process. The periodical cycle must be larger than the total of
NtoR Duration, RST Process and User Application. Hot Start is the process time to reset when there
is no pdata to use. In this case, the system restarts from the beginning of the application. Cold Start is
the process time for the system to recover from failure status without the FUJIMI system. We provide
the following evaluations for the model:
• Qualitative verification:
– Formal proves: We formally prove that the system satisfies the desired properties.
• Quantitative assessment:
– System Configuration Optimization: We find the optimal value of the system’s configurations
according to different noise environments in which the embedded system works.
– System Failure Reduction: We give quantitative evidence to demonstrate that system failure
is reduced.
– Average DownTime Hours/Year: ADT is an average value, which is the time to show how
long the system is out of work for 1 year. ADT is the general industry criteria. From our
analysis, the FUJIMI system decreases the ADT (improves the effectiveness) for most of real
world applications.
5.1 Qualitative Verification
This process formally proves that the model complies with the resilience strategy requirements. Qualita-
tive properties based on Markov chains typically require certain events with probability. These properties
can be used to verify persistence and reachability [6]. We applied the following properties expressed with
PCTL formulas 1−6 (described below) to the model, and refined the model until the values of formula
are satisfied4. The model is refined until the above formulas are satisfied, that demonstrates the model
comply the desired properties.
(1) : P =?[F G(cdata error)]
(2) : A[G(usage(pdatai) < usage(pdata j )∧ (i < j)]
(3) : P≥1 [F hot start]
(4) : A[G(reset waiting∧ (∃i : i > 0∧usage(pdatai) > 0)∧¬noise)⇒ (P≥1[F(¬cdata error)])]
(5) : A[G(noise∧ reset waiting∧ (∄i : i > 0∧usage(pdatai) > 0))⇒ (P≥1[F(hot start)])]
(6) : S =?[hot start])/(S =?[cdata error] ≤ 1
Formula (1) is used to inquire the probability that cdata can always be wrong in the future. This
value must be 0 for the following reasons: The system can be recovered with pdata if there is a valid
pdata, and can be reset initially if all the pdata are invalid. The algorithm does not allow the wrong
4The formulas are expressed in this paper for convenience, but may be different with actual PCTL formulas. For example,
∃i∧usage(pdatai)> 0 is usage(pdata1) > 0∨usage(pdata2) > 0 if there are two pdata in the model because the operators as ‘∃’
are illegal in DTMC.
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status of cdata to continue forever. Formula (2) shows that the process for RST is always from the most
recent valid pdata (usage(pdata) is the available usage number of pdata). This number means that on
All the path, the Global samples satisfy that the pdata with smaller subscript is always used before the
larger subscript.
Formula (3) means that no matter how small the probability, the hot start status can be reached.
Formula (4) can be read as: when the system enters into the loop of reset waiting status, and there is a
valid pdata, the system can be recovered if the noise no longer occurs. This property is itself resilient
and can be understood easily. Formula (5) means that if there is no valid data for recovery and the noise
occurs, the system will definitely enter into hot start.
Let S=?[cdata error] and S=?[hot start] be the values associated with the average of the cdata error
statistic and hot start statistic. Formula (6) implies the probability that hot start is always smaller than
the probability of cdata error caused by noise. This Formula verifies that the FUJIMI system is always
effective in reducing system failure.
5.2 Quantitative Assessment
This section provides three kinds of quantitative assessment: System configuration optimization, system
failure reduction, and Average DownTime.
5.2.1 System Optimizations
In this section three kinds of configurations are adjusted to achieve the minimum system failure or the
highest effectiveness.
Usage Times for pdata: We change the usage times of pdata from 1-3 and the results are shown in
Figure 7. The horizontal axis is the increasing probability of noise occurrence (with a base of 10,000,
for example 57.5 on the horizontal axis represents the noise probability of 57.5/10,000), and the vertical
axis is the probability of system failure. The result shows that the higher the usage time, the lower the
probability of system failure. The difference increases as the noise occurrence decreases. The values can
help users to properly select usage times for different noise environments and the user’s requirements of
system failure probability.
Figure 7: The System Failure Probability for Different Usage
Times
Figure 8: The System Failure For Different Recovery Data
Numbers
The Recovery Data Number: Another system quantity which can be optimized is the pdata number.
The number can be adjusted to achieve the most reduction in system failure. The probability of system
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failure decreases when the recovery data number increases. In the experiments, we sample the S =
?[hot start] for different noise probabilities. The result is shown in Figure 8. The horizontal axis is the
increasing probability of noise occurrence (with a base of 10,000, for example 57.5 on the horizontal
axis represents the noise probability of 57.5/10,000), and the vertical axis is the probability of system
failure. The system failure is reduced as the number increases, but a higher number implies memory
consumption and a higher cost in time for the copying process.
Periodical Cycle: For the resilience strategy described in Section 3, when the noise causes an error,
the system runs into a waiting state until the reset signal RST arises. In different environments, noise
will occur frequently or sparsely. If the noise occurs frequently, then the period must be shorter, which
consequently, makes the waiting time shorter. On the contrary, if the noise occurs sparsely, the periodical
cycle must be longer to reduce the overhead of the save and reset process.
An optimized cycle can be found with the evaluation of system effectiveness. For this goal, after
every kind of transition is annexed with a cost (called reward in PRISM), the proportion of the execution
time for user application to all the elapsed time is calculated. Formula (7) is the proportion of time of
user application to all the elapsed time representing the effectiveness of FUJIMI system. The value in
Formula (7) is annexed with the user application Balloon in Table 1. As the formula is to calculate the
proportion of weightavailable and weighttotal , the values in Formula (7) are 10 times smaller than the actual
values in Table 1 to avoid the explosion problem. Timer costs 1 for user application and reset waiting,
but costs 7,600 for hot start for each tick.
(7)E f f ectiveness = R{“weightavailable/weighttotal”}
rewards weighttotal rewards weightavailable
user application : 1; user application : 1;
reset waiting : 1; endrewards
hot start : 7,600;
endrewards
Figure 9: The System Effectiveness for Different Cycle
Period
Figure 10: The System Failure with and without FUJIMI
System
Figure 9 shows that the most effective time cycles are different for different probabilities of noise.
The horizontal axis is the value for the cycles. The 5 lines represent the effectiveness for 5 kinds of noise
probability of 1/10ms, 1/40ms, 1/70ms, 1/100ms to 1/1s. The most effective point of the cycle period
can be found from the graph. For example, the best effective point is 4ms,9ms, 12ms, 14ms, 25ms for the
5 kinds of noise probability respectively. The results show that the periodical cycle should be set shorter
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if the overhead is small enough because this can avoid the reset waiting to consume much of the effect
time. However, when the noise probability is small, the values increase with a slow curve after violently
bending points. As mentioned at the beginning of this Section, the cycle must be larger than the total
value of User Application time, NtoR Duration time, and RSR Process time. The optimized cycle must
be set to the larger one between the total value and the bending point.
5.2.2 System Failure Reduction
After optimization, the system becomes deterministic, and the system failure with and without FUJIMI
system can be calculated respectively.
(8) : Failure = S[hot start]
The results of Figure 10 serve to demonstrate that the FUJIMI system reduces system failure caused
by noise. The horizontal axis represents the decreasing noise probability and the vertical axis represents
the statistics value of the times that the system enters into Hot Start states as shown in Formula (8). The
most upper line represents the probability of system failure without the FUJIMI system, and the lower
three lines represent the system failure of the three applications in Table 1 with the FUJIMI system.
5.2.3 Average DownTime (ADT)
Average DownTime (ADT) stands for an industry a criterion that evaluates systems which must run
continually. The value is the average time in which systems malfunction and cannot work within one
year. We use formula (9) to evaluate the ADT. 8,760 is the hours in one year. weighttotal represents the
total process time, and weightavailable is the effective process time for user application. Cost for hot start
is substituted as 11, 17,000, 7,600 for the user application Sensor, Logger, Ballon respectively (10 times
smaller than the actual values).
(9)ADT = 8760∗ (1−R{“weightavailable/weighttotol ”})
rewards weighttotal rewards weightavailable
user application : 1; user application : 1;
reset waiting : 1; endrewards
hot start : 7,600;
endrewards
Figure 11: Effectiveness Loss With and Without FU-
JIMI
Figure 11 shows three pairs of lines for
the applications in Table 1. Each pair in-
dicates the values of loss proportion (1 −
R{“weightavailable/weighttotol ”}) with and with-
out the FUJIMI system when the noise proba-
bility decreases along the horizontal axis. The
restart processes without FUJIMI consume the
Cold Start time in Table 1.
The application Sensor has a light process
time for the Cold Start process. The FUJIMI
system makes the effectiveness worse because of
the waiting time as well as the overhead in each
cycle. For the application Logger, because the
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overhead and Hot Start time are relatively heavy, the FUJIMI system is beneficial from the crossing
point where the noise probability is 1/75,000µs. In other words, the FUJIMI system improves the sys-
tem effectiveness only if the noise probability is smaller than 1/75,000µs. In the real world, the noise
occurs with far smaller probability than 1/75,000µs. For the applications Ballon, the FUJIMI system
brings absolute benefit as the overhead and restart time are heavy.
The results compare the effectiveness loss with and without FUJIMI system, and indicate that the
FUJIMI system makes the effectiveness worse if the process for Cold Start is light enough. Nonetheless,
the system without FUJIMI system is an ideal situation in that whenever the error status occurs the
restart can be processed immediately, which is impossible in the real world. In general, the processes are
delayed only after resilience functions as the watch-dog or manual power reset. This latency cannot be
predicated. As the applications represent typical characters with the light, middle and heavy Cold Start
processes, we can affirm that the FUJIMI system can bring benefit to most real world systems.
6 Related Work
Few works have provided an analysis for temporary system failure caused by noise, which, in real world,
cannot be ignored. Our target system is very original for this kind of temporary system failure, which
overall improves resilience with minimum software redundancy. Although there are not exactly similar
related works, several works for resilience systems or fault tolerance with probabilistic model checking
exist.
The paper [8] presented a quantitative analysis to three kinds of resilience models using the Molkov
reword model. This work can be considered as an elementary prototype of the kind of work described
in this paper, but is different from our work, in that our target resilience system is very light N-version
programming. There is no redundancy hardware, and the software alternative needs only minimum
recovery data for a temporary effect from noise.
Another paper [11] presented an approach for the verification of self-adaptive systems that relies on
probabilistic model-checking for obtaining levels of confidence regarding trustworthy service delivery
when a system undergoes adaptation. An environment is stimulated to trigger system adaptation mecha-
nisms, to collect experimental data, to trace the system undergoing adaptation, and to generate a model
from the trace, and then verify the system properties. This work uses a quantitative assessment for a
self-adaptive algorithm. Our work also uses a quantitative assessment, but our work provides more and
different evaluations. Moreover, the model is initially constructed before evaluations in our work.
Still another paper [12] presented a simulation prototype for experimenting with resilience strategies
for network systems. This work supported expectations about resilience strategies and revealed strategy
assumptions, unexpected emergent situations, and insights into strategy configurations. Evaluation of
the system configurations to achieve optimized effectiveness is also a part of our work. But our model is
different because both the evaluation object and methods are different. We formally model a light-weight
redundant system with software against temporary system failure caused by noise, and to provide formal
qualitative and quantitative evaluations.
7 Summary of the Contribution and Future Work
This paper presented qualitative and quantitative evaluations for a novelty resilience system named FU-
JIMI. The resilience system reduces temporary software failure caused by external noise with a light-
weight data-backup mechanism. Until our work, implementation testing has been the most used method
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to evaluate system failure by the software error, but this method is time consuming and costly and only
provides a low accuracy. Our method solved the difficult problem of evaluation for such kind of systems
without a large testing sample. The formal results from the formal model were accurate and reliable.
The qualitative evaluations verified that the FUJIMI system complies with resilience strategy, and
the quantitative evaluations provided assessments of the FUJIMI system such as failure reduction and
ADT. Moreover, the system configurations were optimized. Our method has been demonstrated to be
very effective through three real world applications. Our systematic evaluation methods for qualitative
and quantitative evaluations can be extended to other systems that have probabilistic behaviors.
However, the evaluations only include temporary system failure on level4. Safety Integrity Level
(SIL) [13] is widely used to define the safety properties of software. In the future, we plan to evaluate
the FUJIMI system including the system failure from level0 to level5, and provide assessment values for
IEC 61508 [13].
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